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ANCSA SECTION 7(I): $40 MILLION 
PER WORD AND COUNTING 
AARON M. SCHUTT* 
INTRODUCTION 
“Alaska is often the exception, not the rule.”1 And so it is with both 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 19712 (ANCSA or the “Act”) 
and the unique revenue sharing provision contained at Section 7(i) of the 
Act.3 When the United States Congress passed ANCSA, it made a 
dramatic change in the policy of the United States government related to 
aboriginal land claims. Instead of setting lands aside for reservations for 
Alaska’s Native people,4 Congress directed the creation of twelve for-
profit regional corporations and more than 200 village corporations;5 
allowed them to select forty million acres of land that the United States 
would convey in fee simple to the corporations;6 and provided $962.5 
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1. Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016).
2. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), Pub. L. No. 92-
203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629 (2012)). 
3. ANCSA § 7(i).
4. See ANCSA § 2(b) (“Congress finds and declares that . . . the settlement
should be accomplished . . . without creating a reservation system or lengthy 
wardship and trusteeship . . . .”); see also H.R. REP. No. 92-746, at 40 (1971) (Conf. 
Rep.), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2247, 2253 (“[T]he conference committee 
does not intend that lands granted to Natives under this Act be considered ‘Indian 
reservation’ lands for purposes other than those specified in this Act. The lands 
granted by this Act are not ‘in trust’ and the Native villages are not Indian 
‘reservations.’”).  
5. ANCSA §§ 7, 8, 11.
6. ANCSA § 12. Approximately four million additional acres were set aside
to be conveyed to villages with former Indian reservations that chose to opt out 
of the ANCSA structure: Teltin, Venetie, and Artic Village in the Doyon Region; 
and Elim, Gambell, and Savoonga in the Bering Straits Native Corp. Region. See 
ANCSA § 19.  
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million in compensation to the corporations.7 
The resource revenue-sharing provision contained in Section 7(i) is 
an important and unique element of ANCSA.8 The two sentences that 
comprise the original Section 7(i) facilitated the passage of the Act,9 
dominated the early interactions amongst and between regional and 
village corporations,10 and have had enormous economic impact on 
Alaska Native corporations in the decades since passage of the Act.11 
Section 7(i) still has important consequences for Alaska Native 
corporations and their resource development partners more than forty 
years after the passage of ANCSA. As highlighted by the title of this 
article, the amount shared between Alaska Native corporations pursuant 
to Section 7(i) is enormous, well in excess of $2 billion.12 
 
 7. See ANCSA § 6 (creating the “Alaska Native Fund” at the United States 
Treasury and providing that “$462,500,000 from the general fund of the Treasury” 
and “$500,000,000 pursuant to the revenue sharing provisions” be available to 
fund the settlement).  
 8. ANCSA § 7(i). There has been significant scholarship regarding ANCSA 
generally. See, e.g., DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND 
AMERICAN LAWS, 165–98 (3d ed. 2012); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN 
LAW, § 4.07[3] (Neil Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK]; Eric C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: 
A Critical Reexamination of The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. 
REV. 107 (2008); James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act at 35: 
Delivering on the Promise, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 12 (2007); James E. 
Torgerson, Indians Against Immigrants—Old Rivals, New Rules: A Brief Review and 
Comparison of Indian Law in the Contiguous United States, Alaska, and Canada, 14 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 57 (1989); Arthur Lazarus, Jr. & W. Richard West, Jr., The Alaska 
Native Claims Settlement Act: A Flawed Victory, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 132 
(1976). Regarding some specific provisions of ANCSA, see, e.g., Gregory S. Fisher 
& Erin “Faith” Rose, Selling Ice in Alaska: Employment Preferences and Statutory 
Exemptions for Alaska Native Corporations 40 Years After ANCSA, 31 ALASKA L. REV. 
1 (2014); Kathryn A. Black et al., When Worlds Collide: Alaska Native Corporations 
and the Bankruptcy Code, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 73 (1989). Surprisingly little has been 
written about Section 7(i). See CASE & VOLUCK, supra, at 43, 176–77; COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK, supra, § 4.07[3][b]; Lazarus & West, supra, at 153–64.  
 9. See ROBERT D. ARNOLD, ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS 137 (1976); see also 
Interview with Margaret Brown, President and Chief Executive Officer (Retired), 
Cook Inlet Region, Inc., Anchorage, Alaska (Apr. 26, 2016).  
 10. See, e.g., Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek Native Corp., 725 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1978); Ukpeagvik 
Inupiat Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alaska 1981).  
 11. See, e.g., Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., ASRC Reaches Historic 
Milestone in Revenue Sharing (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.asrc.com/ 
PressReleases/Pages/ASRC-Historic-Revenue-Sharing.aspx (announcing that 
ARSC has distributed over $1 billion to other Alaska Native Corporations 
pursuant to Section 7(i) obligations).  
 12. See id.; NANA REG’L CORP, INC., Red Dog Mine, http://www.nana.com/ 
regional/resources/red-dog-mine (last visited Sept. 12, 2016) (“NANA has 
distributed $820 million to other regions and at-large shareholder[s] via the 7(i) 
sharing provisions.”); Press Release, Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Announces 
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This article will review the history of Section 7(i), compare ANCSA’s 
structure to other aboriginal land settlement structures worldwide—with 
a focus on revenue-sharing mechanisms (or lack thereof)—, and review 
the years of litigation focused on Section 7(i) that followed the passage of 
ANCSA. The article will then review the Settlement Agreement reached 
between the twelve Alaska Native regional corporations regarding 
Section 7(i) and the various consequences and outcomes of that 
Agreement since its signing in 1982. The article ends with a discussion of 
the interesting tax and bankruptcy issues associated with Section 7(i), as 
well as several current, unresolved issues regarding Section 7(i) and the 
Settlement Agreement. 
HISTORY OF SECTION 7(I) 
The history of Section 7(i) must be read in context with the overall 
history of ANCSA. ANCSA was an ambitious attempt to rapidly settle the 
land claims of multiple ethnic Native groups in Alaska over an immense 
land area and was complicated by the specific land histories in different 
areas of the state.13 
The Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) was the statewide 
organization formed in 1966 primarily to represent Alaska Native 
interests with regard to land claims.14 One issue that arose among AFN’s 
members was the knowledge that natural resources were not equally 
distributed across the various regions of the state.15 It was also well 
known that certain groups across Alaska needed and used more land than 
others within their traditional areas due to concentrations of fish and 
game, cultural practices, population densities, and geographic features.16 
As land claims settlement ideas progressed, the so-called “land-loss 
formula” emerged as a remedy to the unequal land usage issue. Under 
the formula, Native groups that historically used greater land areas and 
were therefore giving up more territory under the land claims settlement 
 
December Distribution Totaling $11.7 Million (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.sealaska.com/news/item/2013-11-15/sealaska-announces-
december-distribution-totaling-117-million (noting “Sealaska has paid more than 
$317 million in [the Section 7(i)] pool”).  
 13. See S. REP. NO. 91-925, at 57–58 (1970) (explaining how the Committee had 
to consider “the bewildering diversity” of Alaska Native tribes’ differing 
“patterns of their historic use of the land.”); ANCSA § 2(b) (“Congress finds and 
declares that . . . the settlement should be accomplished rapidly . . . .”).  
 14. See ALASKA FED’N OF NATIVES, History, http://www.nativefederation.org/ 
about-afn/history/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2016). 
 15. See Interview with Margaret Brown, supra note 9. 
 16. See S. REP. NO. 91-925, at 59 (finding that “[t]here are great differences in 
the intensity and in the continuity of land use by the Native people of Alaska.”).  
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received more entitlement under ANCSA.17 The “land loss” formula was 
one half of “the foundation for a settlement acceptable to Native regions 
having mineral potential and those without, and those having large 
populations and those only lightly populated;” the other half was revenue 
sharing from natural resource development.18 
Origins of the Revenue Sharing Idea 
The first time a Section 7(i)-like provision arose was in the 1968 
Senate version of a bill titled the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act.19 
In that bill, the largest proportion of resource revenue was still retained 
by the local Native group at seventy-five percent, with the next largest 
amount to the area regional corporation at twenty percent; but, 
importantly, five percent was to be paid to a statewide corporation to be 
organized and charged with a mission of economic development.20 In the 
legislation preceding ANCSA, this was a first attempt to require sharing 
of resource revenue derived from one region with other Alaska Natives 
statewide. 
AFN board members first discussed the idea of revenue sharing 
from mineral development at a three-day board meeting from May 15 to 
18, 1969. The board directed that mineral revenue resource sharing be 
included in the drafts of AFN’s positions with the following distribution: 
“25% village, 25% regional, [and] 50% statewide to all regions on [a] 
population basis.”21 
A month later, on June 20, 1969, AFN published a position paper 
which included the first documented mention of the revenue-sharing 
principle that became Section 7(i): 
All mineral interests should be granted to the regional 
corporation in whose area the minerals are found, and any 
revenues received by a regional corporation from those interests 
should be divided in the following ratio: 50% to the regional 
corporation in whose area the mineral is found, and 50% to be 
divided among all of the other regional corporations on a 
population basis.22 
 
 17. ANCSA § 12.  
 18. ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 137.  
 19. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1968, S. 3859, 90th Cong. (1968).  
 20. Id. at § 9.  
 21. Minutes of Board Meeting of May 15–18, Alaska Fed’n of Natives (1969) 
(Alice E. Brown papers, Archives & Special Collections, Consortium Libr., Univ. 
of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with author).  
 22. Position with Respect to the Native Land Claim Issue 6–7, Alaska Fed’n of 
Natives (June 20, 1969) (Alice E. Brown papers, Archives & Special Collections, 
33.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:00 PM 
2016 $40 MILLION PER WORD AND COUNTING 233 
Later in 1969, the idea of revenue sharing was introduced to Alaska 
Native land claims legislation, first in amendments to Senate Bill 1830: 
Each regional corporation shall be entitled to fifty per cent of the 
net proceeds derived from the sale, lease, permit, development, 
use or other disposition of lands, interests in lands, and minerals 
to which it acquires a patent under subsection 12(b)(3) and (4) of 
this Act. The remaining 50 per centum of such net proceeds shall 
be distributed among all the other regional corporations in direct 
proportion to the Native population of such other regions . . . .23 
The bill’s use of fifty percent to be shared among other regions 
became one of the more consistent sharing proportions in legislative 
proposals to follow. 
Two bills addressing Alaska Native land claims, known as the 
Alaska Federation of Natives (AFN) bills, were introduced in the new 
Congress of 1971.24  Introduced by Senators Fred Harris (Oklahoma) and 
Ted Kennedy (Massachusetts) and Representative Lloyd Meeds 
(Washington), these bills featured “full title to 60 million acres of land, an 
initial payment of $500 million, perpetual sharing in minerals from lands 
given up, and the establishment of regional corporations.”25 
The House bill required that revenue derived from timber and 
subsurface resources be distributed on a population basis to all Alaska 
Natives: “In order that all Natives may benefit equally from any minerals 
discovered within a particular region, each corporation must share its 
mineral revenues with the other 11 corporations on the basis of the 
relative number of stockholders in each region.”26 
The Senate bill, in contrast, had a structure that required fifty percent 
of the revenues from timber and subsurface resources be shared with the 
other regional corporations.27 Ultimately, “[t]he Conference Committee 
of both houses of Congress adopted a compromise provision requiring 
the resource-owning Corporation to share 70% of its timber and 
 
Consortium Libr., Univ. of Alaska Anchorage) (on file with author). The AFN 
position paper was later incorporated into the Congressional record. See Alaska 
Native Land Claims Pt. 1: Hearings on H.R. 13142 & H.R. 10193 Before the H. Subcomm. 
on Indian Affairs of the Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 91st Cong. 49, 50 (1969). 
 23. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1969, S. 1830, amendment no. 221, 
91st Cong. § 9(g)(2) (Oct. 2, 1969). 
 24. See S. 835, 92d Cong. (1971) (A bill providing a settlement of the Alaska 
Native land claims); H.R. 7039, 92d Cong. (1971) (same). 
 25. ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 137.  
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 92-523 at 6 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 
2196.  
 27. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, S. 35, 92d Cong. § 9(j)(1) (1971). 
33.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:00 PM 
234 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:2 
subsurface resource revenue among all of the Corporations.”28 This 
became the language of Section 7(i). 
Section 7(i) and Amendments 
The original text of Section 7(i) was only two sentences: 
Seventy per centum of all revenues received by each Regional 
Corporation from the timber resources and subsurface estate 
patented to it pursuant to this Act shall be divided annually by 
the Regional Corporation among all twelve Regional 
Corporations organized pursuant to this section according to the 
number of Natives enrolled in each region pursuant to Section 5. 
The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to the 
Thirteenth Regional Corporation if organized pursuant to 
subsection (c) hereof.29 
These two sentences were a significant part of the political 
compromise in the Alaska Native community relating to ANCSA that 
facilitated both the passage of the Act and its implementation in Alaska. 
Without the sharing of the revenues from timber and mineral 
development with Natives statewide, there would have been a gross 
disparity between the “have not” regional corporations and the “haves.”30 
Through Section 7(i), Congress: 
intended to achieve a rough equality in assets among all the 
Natives. . . . (The section) insures that all of the Natives will 
benefit in roughly equal proportions from these assets. . . . 
Congress required that 70 percent of all revenues from the 
development of timber and subsurface resources be distributed 
among the Regional Corporations.31 
Congress has amended Section 7(i) twice since 1971 to address 
specific issues as they arose. In 1995, Congress amended Section 7(i) to 
make clear that net operating loss sales, and other federal tax benefits, are 
not shareable revenues.32 This amendment was in direct response to then-
 
 28. Report of the Special Master Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53, at 3 (Mar. 28, 
1983) (on file with author) [hereinafter Special Master Report]; see Aleut Corp. v. 
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 417 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1976).  
 29. ANCSA § 7(i), Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688, 693 (codified as amended 
at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)).  
 30. Linxwiler, supra note 8, at § 12-03[3][a].  
 31. Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723, 732 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(punctuation in original).  
 32. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, sec. 109, § 7(i), 109 Stat. 353, 357 
(1995) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ does not include any 
benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or credits earned by a 
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pending Ninth Circuit litigation in Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village 
Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc.33 
In 1998, Congress amended ANCSA including a significant 
amendment to Section 7(i).34 Incorporating the ANCSA settlement 
agreement provisions regarding sand, gravel and rock,35 the amendments 
exclude those resources from ANCSA sharing. The full text of Section 7(i), 
following the 1998 amendments, is as follows: 
(1) (A) Except as provided by subparagraph (B), 70 percent of all 
revenues received by each Regional Corporation from the timber 
resources and subsurface estate patented to it pursuant to this 
chapter shall be divided annually by the Regional Corporation 
among all twelve Regional Corporations organized pursuant to 
this section according to the number of Natives enrolled in each 
region pursuant to section 1604 of this title. The provisions of 
this subsection shall not apply to the thirteenth Regional 
Corporation if organized pursuant to subsection (c) hereof. 
(B) In the case of the sale, disposition, or other use of common 
varieties of sand, gravel, stone, pumice, peat, clay, or cinder 
resources made during a fiscal year ending after October 31, 
1998, the revenues received by a Regional Corporation shall not 
be subject to division under subparagraph (A). Nothing in this 
subparagraph is intended to or shall be construed to alter the 
ownership of such sand, gravel, stone, pumice, peat, clay, or 
cinder resources. 
(2) For purposes of this subsection, the term “revenues” does not 
include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses 
incurred or credits earned by a Regional Corporation.36 
Section 7(i) has not been amended since 1998. 
Section 7(i) and ANCSA’s Corporate Share Structure 
Three distinct groups were to be beneficiaries of resource revenue 
sharing under Section 7(i): regional corporations, village corporations, 
and at-large shareholders. The share structure of regional and village 
 
Regional Corporation.”).  
 33. 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997). The Bay View case and decision is discussed 
infra at E.2.a. 
 34. See ANCSA Land Bank Protection Act of 1998, sec. 8, § 7(i), 112 Stat. 3129, 
3134 (1998).  
 35. See Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (June 29, 1982) (on file with author). 
A current version of the Settlement Agreement with two amendments made since 
1982 is available at: http://www.lbblawyers.com/ancsa/7i%20Settlement%20 
Agreement%20AMENDED.pdf [hereinafter Settlement Agreement]. 
 36. ANCSA § 7(i).  
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corporations explains how the ultimate benefits of resource development 
from ANCSA lands reach Alaska Natives individually and collectively. 
Under ANCSA, regional corporations were directed to enroll eligible 
Alaska Natives and issue each 100 shares.37 Each Alaska Native eligible 
for enrollment in a regional corporation was also potentially eligible to be 
enrolled in a village corporation within the same region, where they 
would be issued 100 shares of village corporation stock.38 Those 
shareholders enrolled in a regional corporation but who were either not 
eligible or chose not to be enrolled in a village corporation have come to 
be called at-large shareholders.39 
Section 7(j) provided one mechanism for sharing the economic 
benefits of resource development with village corporations and at-large 
shareholders: 
During the five years following December 18, 1971, not less than 
10% of all corporate funds received by each of the twelve 
Regional Corporations under section 1605 of this title (Alaska 
Native Fund), and under subsection (i) of this section (revenues 
from the timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it 
pursuant to this chapter), and all other net income, shall be 
distributed among the stockholders of the twelve Regional 
Corporations. Not less than 45% of funds from such sources 
during the first five-year period, and 50% thereafter, shall be 
distributed among the Village Corporations in the region and 
the class of stockholders who are not residents of those Villages 
. . . .40 
In sum, at-large shareholders are entitled to direct payment of their 
share of 7(i) revenue while village corporations and regional corporations 
receive the population proportionate share of Section 7(i) revenue. 
The Significance of Section 7(i) Sharing 
The sharing of natural resource revenue under Section 7(i) has had 
enormous impact on the finances of Alaska Native corporations, both 
regional and village. Well over $2 billion has been shared under the 
provision since 1971.41 Many village corporations rely on annual 
 
 37. ANCSA §§ 5, 7. 
 38. See ANCSA §§ 5, 7, 8 (providing eligibility requirements and benefits for 
enrollment in regional and village corporations).  
 39. Linxwiler, supra note 8, at §12.03[3][b]. 
 40. ANCSA § 7(j).  
 41. See Press Release, Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., supra note 11 (noting ASRC 
had shared over $1 billion under Section 7(i)); NANA REG’L CORP., INC., supra note 
11 (“NANA has distributed $820 million to other regions and at-large 
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distributions of Section 7(j) money for large percentages of their income.42 
Planned and future projects, including the Donlin Gold Project on 
Calista Corporation land, also model and plan for Section 7(i) sharing as 
a part of the project economics. In the recently published draft 
environmental impact statement for the Donlin project, the report notes: 
“As with all subsurface resource development projects on ANCSA 
regional corporation lands (excluding industrial minerals), 70 percent of 
project royalties received by Calista would be shared with other regional 
corporations under Section 7(i) of ANCSA.”43 The report estimates annual 
royalties to Calista would average $55.4 million, 70 percent of which—or 
$38.8 million—would be subject to sharing under Section 7(i).44 
COMPARISON TO OTHER ABORIGINAL LAND SETTLEMENTS 
To better understand the unique aspects of ANCSA and Section 7(i), 
it is useful to review the ways in which the United States and other 
countries have dealt with aboriginal title issues and land claims 
settlements outside of Alaska.45 The concept of Section 7(i) does not have 
an analogue anywhere else in the world. A number of countries, 
especially the former British colonies of Canada, New Zealand, and 
Australia, recognize the legal incidence of aboriginal title, and certain 
rights and privileges regarding the same. However, none has entered a 
comprehensive settlement with multiple indigenous groups where 
resources on the lands of one require some sort of revenue sharing with 
other groups. 
 
shareholder[s] via the 7(i) sharing provisions.”); Press Release, Sealaska Corp., 
supra note 11 (noting “Sealaska has paid more than $317 million in [the section 
7(i)] pool.”).  
 42.  See ALEXANDRA J. MCCLANAHAN, ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS: 
SAKUUKTUGUT, ‘WE ARE WORKING INCREDIBLY HARD’ 77 (2006) (“‘For some village 
corporations, it’s the only income,’ said Tom Hawkins, Chief Operating Officer of 
Bristol Bay Native Corporation.”); see, e.g., OLGOONIK CORP. & SUBSIDIARY, 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND SCHEDULES 3 (2009), 
https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/10592-olgoonik-fin-10 (showing 
that Section 7(j) income was 43% of the corporation’s net income in 2009, with 
Section 7(j) receipts totaling $727,624 out of $1,691,587 in net income).  
 43. DONLIN GOLD PROJECT, DRAFT ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT, 3.18-42, 
http://www.donlingoldeis.com/Documents/8%20Environmental%20Analysis
%20Social.pdf.  
 44. See id. at 3.18-41. 
 45. This section is not intended to address in any depth the issues faced by 
indigenous peoples around the world who have faced and continue to face 
aboriginal land claims challenges, many of which remain unresolved. See, e.g., 
LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & ISABELLE ANGUELOVSKI, ADDRESSING THE LAND CLAIMS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 52–54 (Mass. Inst. of Tech. Program on Human Rights & Just. 
ed., 2008), http://web.mit.edu/publicdisputes/projarea/pdf/ indigenous_ 
peoples.pdf.  
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United States 
In the United States, the doctrine of aboriginal title has been 
recognized since Johnson v. M’Intosh in 1823.46 While important, the use 
and occupancy rights established under the doctrine of aboriginal title are 
not equivalent to other forms of recognized title under United States 
law.47 Aboriginal title, for instance, can be extinguished by purchase, 
conquest, abandonment, or the death of all members of the tribe holding 
the title.48 Since the time of M’Intosh, the United States government has 
implemented a practice of purchasing aboriginal lands by treaty, and later 
through lands claims.49 
ANCSA differed from the historic practice of settling aboriginal title 
claims in several significant ways. First, Congress did not attempt to tie 
the settlement of land claims through ANCSA directly to aboriginal title 
of Alaska Natives. This change was recognized and explained in House 
Report Number 92-523, which accompanied a predecessor bill to ANCSA: 
It has been the consistent policy of the United States Government 
in its dealings with Indian Tribes to grant to them title to a 
portion of the lands which they occupied, to extinguish the 
aboriginal title to the remainder of the lands by placing such 
lands in the public domain, and to pay the fair value of the titles 
extinguished. This procedure was initiated by treaties in the 
earlier part of our history, and was completed by the enactment 
of the Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946. . . .50 
The House report recognized that ANCSA was not following this 
policy: “The pending bill does not purport to determine the number of 
acres to which the Natives might be able to prove an aboriginal title.”51 
Importantly, this change from requiring proven aboriginal title in 
exchange for either a reservation—which usually encompassed some 
diminished land base within the original area of proven aboriginal title—
and/or compensation for extinguished aboriginal title probably helped 
facilitate the concept of Section 7(i). It is easier to require sharing of 
mineral wealth when there is no proven aboriginal title to a particular 
land base and its associated minerals. 
 
 46. 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  
 47. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 8, at 60–61 (distinguishing Native 
occupancy rights from Fifth Amendment property rights).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. See ARNOLD, supra note 9, at 2–11 (tracing history of Alaska land 
ownership).  
 50. H.R. REP. No. 92-523, at 4 (1971), as reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 
2193–94.  
 51. Id. 
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ANCSA also introduced a corporate model and authorized the 
creation of the corporations to hold the land. Interestingly, Congress has 
employed the use of a corporate model on several other occasions 
involving Native Americans. In the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 
Congress provided that: 
The Secretary of the Interior may, upon petition by any tribe, 
issue a charter of incorporation to such tribe . . . . Such charter 
may convey to the incorporated tribe the power to purchase, 
take by gift, or bequest, or otherwise, own, hold, manage, 
operate, and dispose of property of every description, real and 
personal, including the power to purchase restricted Indian 
lands and to issue in exchange therefor interests in corporate 
property, and such further powers as may be incidental to the 
conduct of corporate business, not inconsistent with law . . . .52 
Since then, a number of American Indian tribes have used Section 17 
corporations to hold various business interests. But other than the basic 
corporate form, Section 17 corporations do not share any other attributes 
with ANCSA corporations and there is no analogous provision to Section 
7(i). 
In 1978 in the case of the Narragansett Tribe in Rhode Island, 
Congress provided for the creation of a state-chartered, non-profit 
corporation as the entity to receive a combination of private and state 
lands and money, in settlement of aboriginal title claims.53 As with the 
case of section 17 federal corporations, the Narragansett Tribe of Indians 
Corporation does not share any of the attributes of ANCSA corporations 
and there is no analogous provision to Section 7(i). 
Canada 
The Canadian government has addressed aboriginal title and other 
First Nation issues in ways similar to the United States by (1) recognizing 
aboriginal title; and (2) negotiating settlements with First Nation 
groups.54 No equivalent to ANCSA exists in Canada. There is a growing 
 
 52. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383 § 17, 48 Stat. 
984, 988 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 5124 (2016), formerly codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 477 (2012)). 
 53. Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 95-395, 92 Stat. 
813 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1716 (2012)); see also 37 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 37-18-1 to 18-18 (creating the corporation under Rhode Island law).  
 54. See Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 (Can.); 
Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (Can.); 
ABORIGINAL SELF-GOVERNMENT IN CANADA 17–18 (John H. Hylton ed., 2d ed. 1999); 
Torgerson, supra note 8, at 75 (noting that in 1973, the Supreme Court of Canada 
“acknowledged the existence of aboriginal title”). 
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concept of resource revenue sharing in Canada’s aboriginal land 
settlements; but it is focused on sharing revenue between the various 
governments, including the local tribal government whose traditional 
lands are used for resource development.55 
Canada has settled First Nation aboriginal title claims in recent 
decades, including in the Yukon Territories and British Columbia. One 
such settlement was with the Nisga’a Nation in British Columbia.56 The 
agreement “constitutes the full and final settlement in respect of the 
aboriginal rights, including aboriginal title, in Canada of the Nisga’a 
Nation.”57 Nothing in this Agreement affects, recognizes or provides any 
rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 for any aboriginal 
people other than the Nisga’a Nation.58 In short, Canada has no 
equivalent to Section 7(i) in its aboriginal land settlements. 
Australia and New Zealand 
Australia recognizes the incidence of aboriginal title.59 In 1993, the 
Australian Parliament enacted the Native Title Act, which recognized 
aboriginal title, set forth procedures for establishing title by specific 
aboriginal groups, and provided for the ability of aboriginal groups to 
negotiate compensation for both past and future acts affecting such title.60 
Australia has at least two examples of aboriginal land claims 
settlements with similarities to ANCSA, but no equivalent to Section 7(i). 
In 1976, the Australian Parliament settled aboriginal land claims in the 
Northern Territory with the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (ALRA).61 The 
ALRA, like ANCSA, used the corporate form to structure Aboriginal land 
holdings.62 In the case of the ALRA, land trusts were formed to hold the 
 
 55. See KEN S. COATES, SHARING THE WEALTH: HOW RESOURCE REVENUE 
AGREEMENTS CAN HONOUR TREATIES, IMPROVE COMMUNITIES, AND FACILITATE 
CANADIAN DEVELOPMENT 10 (MacDonald-Laurier Inst. ed., 2015), 
http://www.usask.ca/icngd/publications/reports/Reports-Files/MLI-
resource-revenue-sharing.pdf. 
 56. See Nisga’a Final Agreement dated Apr. 27, 1999, http://www.nnkn.ca/ 
files/u28/nis-eng.pdf.  
 57. Id. at ch. 2, ¶ 22.  
 58. Id. at ch. 2. ¶ 33. 
 59. See Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 10 (Austl.) [hereinafter NTA]; see also Mabo 
v Queensland [No. 2] (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.).  
 60. NTA 1993 ss 4(1), 10 (Austl.) (recognizing aboriginal title); NTA at pt 3 
(application for determination of native title); NTA at s 48 (compensation for acts 
lessening the value of native title).   
 61. See Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act of 1976 (Cth) (Austl.) 
[hereinafter ALRA]; see also Martha Hirschfield, Note, The Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act: Tribal Sovereignty and the Corporate Form, 101 YALE L.J. 1331, 1349–
53 (1992) (comparing ANCSA to ALRA).  
 62. See ALRA s 4 (granting land to aboriginal land trusts).  
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land.63 Governance of those lands was provided by land councils, 
composed of aboriginals from the area.64 While the ALRA anticipated that 
land councils would receive rents and royalties for economic 
development activities on the lands, it has no mechanism for sharing 
those revenues with other councils established by the act.65 
In 1995, the Australian Parliament authorized the creation of the 
Indigenous Land Corporation (ILC).66 The ILC  is a corporate entity 
established to “assist Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people acquire 
and manage land to achieve economic, environmental, social and cultural 
benefits.”67 The corporate mission of the ILC and its corporate form 
closely resemble some aspects of ANCSA corporations, but there is no 
provision analogous to Section 7(i) for resources developed from ILC 
lands. 
New Zealand has recognized aboriginal title at least since the Treaty 
of Waitangi, executed between the Queen of the United Kingdom and the 
tribes of New Zealand in 1840.68 New Zealand also has engaged in land 
settlements with various Maori groups.69 Somewhat like ANCSA, land 
transferred to Maori groups pursuant to settlements are made to 
 
 63. Id. at s 5 (function of land trust to hold title to land).  
 64. Id. at s 13 (requiring land councils to consent to granting of interest in land 
held by land trust).  
 65. See id. at s 16 (establishing payment of rents including mining interests).  
 66. Land Fund & Indigenous Land Corp. (ATSIC Amends.) Act 1995 (Cth) s 191A 
(Austl.); INDIGENOUS LAND CORP., http://www.ilc.gov.au (last visited July 15, 
2016).  
 67. See About Us, INDIGENOUS LAND CORP., 
http://www.ilc.gov.au/Home/About-Us (last visited July 15, 2016) 
(summarizing provisions of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 2005 (Cth) s 
191B (Austl.)).  
 68. Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840 (N.Z.). See also Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975, sch. 1 (N.Z.). The English text of the treaty is reprinted as Schedule 1 of the 
Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975. Id. The second article of the treaty is a familiar 
restatement of aboriginal title:  
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs 
and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and 
individuals thereof the full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their 
Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries [sic] and other properties which they 
may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and 
desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United 
Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right 
of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be 
disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the 
respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat 
with them in that behalf. 
Id. at sch 1, art 2.  
 69. See, e.g., Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, pt 2 (N.Z.).  
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corporate entities, in this case trusts.70 But there is no equivalent to Section 
7(i) in the settlement legislation. 
THE EARLY YEARS OF SECTION 7(I): PRE-SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
CONFUSION & LITIGATION 
The brevity of Section 7(i) and lack of definitions of the terms used 
in it led to annual litigation among and between regional and village 
corporations in the 1970s.71 The first cases required the courts to interpret 
ANCSA and establish basic principles. 
In 1974, Doyon filed a civil action against NANA Regional 
Corporation in the District Court of the District of Columbia.72 The court 
issued a memorandum decision in May 1976.73 The case resolved basic 
issues related to Section 7(i). The first was whether Section 7(i) provided 
for the sharing of net or gross revenue.74 The term “revenue” is not 
defined in ANCSA, and the court noted that “[n]either legislative history 
argument [was] persuasive” because Congress was focused on “debating 
the percentage of such revenues to be shared.”75 
The second issue the court addressed—one of the most important 
and lasting choices facing regional corporations—was the distinction 
between generating resource revenues as an active or passive landowner: 
A Regional Corporation can generate revenues from its subsurface 
estate in one of two ways. It can take the role of an “active” landowner 
and itself explore for, develop and produce the resource, most likely 
 
 70. See id., at ss 18–24. 
 71. See Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53 (D. Alaska 1975) (six 
decisions from this docket are discussed infra). See also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-13-121, REGIONAL ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS: STATUS 40 YEARS 
AFTER ESTABLISHMENT, AND FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 6 n.10 (2012) (“The 7(i) 
distribution was the subject of much litigation in the 1970s . . . .”); TANANA CHIEFS 
CONFERENCE, INC., INTERIOR REGION POST ANCSA IMPACT ANALYSIS VOLUME II, Sec. 
13, at 8 (1983) (“The most litigation regarding implementation of ANCSA by the 
Native corporations has been in the area of ‘revenue sharing.’ ‘Revenue sharing’ 
refers to a system established by 43 USC 1606 [sic] for the sharing of income from 
settlement assets between Native corporations.”). 
 72. Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Reg’l. Corp. (Doyon v. NANA), No. 1531-74 (D.D.C. 
1974) (unreported mem. op.) (on file with author). Within Doyon, the challenges 
of Section 7(i) were recognized immediately and discussed at an organizational 
meeting in early 1973. See Minutes of the Reorganization Committee, Tanana 
Chiefs Conference at 2 (Feb. 19, 1973) (on file with author). 
 73. Doyon v. NANA. Several issues addressed in the memorandum decision 
were also at issue in the Aleut and Doyon cases discussed infra including pre-
patent revenues, non-monetary forms of consideration, and the special case of 
Section 19(b) Natives.  
 74. See id. at 5–12.  
 75. Id. at 6–7.  
33.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:00 PM 
2016 $40 MILLION PER WORD AND COUNTING 243 
expending considerable sums of money in the process. Alternatively, it 
may act as a “passive” landowner and contract with another party which 
undertakes at its expense all the necessary exploration, development, and 
production of the resource.76 
As discussed below, the distinct choice between active and passive 
land ownership became a major source of conflict and dominated the 
structure of the later 1982 Settlement Agreement. The court noted 
Congress’s express desire for equality amongst the regions under the 
settlement and concluded that “equality will not be retained if the 
resource-owning region must bear the entire burden of producing the 
revenues” without the ability to offset the associated expenses.77 The 
court further proposed “strictly limit[ing] [the] net concept allowing only 
deductions which are directly related to the production of § 7(i) 
revenues.”78 The court expressly disallowed “land selection expenses, 
salaries of regular corporate employees, or overhead or administrative 
expenses.”79 
One additional administrative matter decided was the timing of 
required distributions under Section 7(i) and interest on late payments.80 
The court held that a regional corporation was “required to pay interest 
on all distributable amounts which it fails to distribute within ninety (90) 
days after the end of the fiscal year in which the section 7(i) revenues are 
received.”81 
In April 1975, the Aleut Corporation (along with four other regional 
corporations) filed suit against Arctic Slope Regional Corporation 
(ASRC).82 Later, each of the remaining six regional corporations was 
joined as a defendant in a long-running case “between the ‘haves’ and 
‘have-nots’.”83 In 1976, the District Court for the District of Alaska issued 
four orders (hereinafter Aleut I, II, III, and IV) establishing several basic 
principles for interpreting and implementing Section 7(i).84 
 
 76. Id. at 9.  
 77. Id. at 10.  
 78. Id. at 11.  
 79. Id. Notably, this is one of the few areas where the regional corporations 
incorporate provisions into the Settlement Agreement directly contrary to the 
judicial precedent of earlier litigated cases. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 
35, at 45–46, 67 (first designating land selection costs as allowable passive Section 
7(i) costs; then designating the same of general and administrative costs).  
 80. See Doyon v. NANA at 14.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53 (D. Alaska 1975).  
 83. Special Master Report, supra note 28, at 4. 
 84. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut I), 410 F. Supp. 1196 (D. 
Alaska 1976); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut II), 417 F. Supp. 900 
(D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 
569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut III), 421 
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In Aleut I, the court resolved an important early issue of “whether 
the revenues received by a regional corporation from timber or a 
subsurface resource prior to issuance of a patent formally conveying to 
the regional corporation title to the land” are subject to Section 7(i).85 The 
issue came down to the phrase “patented to it” in Section 7(i): ASRC 
argued that the phrase meant that only lands where the patent had issued 
from the United States to the regional corporation were subject to Section 
7(i).86 
The court was unconvinced, finding that the language was “not that 
clear” and could “also refer to the type of lands subject to Section 7(i), 
rather than the question of when such lands come under 7(i).”87 Turning 
to the legislative history, the court noted that “[s]ince Congress realized 
there would be certain delays in the issuance of patents, . . . it is reasonable 
to conclude that Congress did not intend the actual issuance of a patent 
to be critical to the operation of Section 7(i).”88 The court observed that a 
ruling which held that only lands patented to a regional corporation were 
subject to Section 7(i) would encourage all sorts of gamesmanship with 
regard to the structuring of resource transactions prior to patents 
issuing.89 For example, a regional corporation might “attempt to receive 
artificially large bonus payments prior to patent, in conjunction with a 
proportionately smaller royalty percentage generating revenues 
subsequent to patent.”90 The court concluded that “revenues received 
from timber resources and the subsurface estate are not excluded from 
the sharing formula of section 7(i) solely for the reason that they are 
received prior to the issuance of a patent or interim conveyance to the 
land from which they are properly attributable to.”91 
In Aleut II, the court addressed three critical issues.92 First, the court 
determined whether payments made to regional corporations by third 
party companies for the right to explore for natural resources on ANCSA 
land were shareable under Section 7(i).93 Eleven of the regional 
corporations agreed that those payments should be shareable; ASRC 
 
F.Supp. 862 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay 
Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978); Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. 
(Aleut IV), 424 F. Supp. 397 (D. Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom. Chugach Natives, Inc. 
v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 85. Aleut I, 410 F. Supp. at 1198.  
 86. See id. at 1199.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1621(j) (1971)).  
 89. Id. at 1200.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id.  
 92. Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. 900, 902 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. Doyon, 
Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 93. Id.  
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disagreed.94 The court held that the “crucial language is ‘[a]ll revenues . . 
. from the . . . subsurface estate,’” thus making clear that payments for 
exploration rights should be subject to Section 7(i).95 
Second, the court addressed whether nonmonetary consideration 
received by a regional corporation related to a resource transaction was 
subject to Section 7(i).96 While all parties agreed with the general principle 
that all benefits received should be subject to sharing under Section 7(i), 
there was a disagreement over how to value those benefits.97 The court 
stated that “non-monetary and indirect benefits should be discouraged in 
the context of section 7(i) because of the problems that they invite,” and 
held that non-monetary benefits should be valued at the greatest of: 
(a) the fair market value of the non-monetary benefit received; 
(b) the cost or detriment to the entity furnishing the non-
monetary benefit; or 
(c) the difference between the royalty or other cash 
consideration actually received and that which would have 
been received but for the furnishing of the non-monetary 
benefit.98 
The last issue in Aleut II involved how to count the number of 
“Natives enrolled” in each region.99 This issue was important for both the 
distribution formula under Section 7(i) and for distribution of funds from 
the Alaska Native Fund under section 6(c) of the Act.100 The issue arose 
in the Doyon and Bering Straits Regions, where several villages elected to 
take title to former reserve lands under section 19(b) of the Act.101 The 
counting methodology was important because both the formula for 
dividing money under section 6(c)—the Alaska Native Fund—and 
Section 7(i) depended upon both the total number of eligible Natives 
enrolled under the Act and the proportion of Natives enrolled in each 
region. If Natives who were members of villages that made the section 
19(b) election were counted, the percentages would slightly favor Doyon 
and Bering Straits.102 
 
 94. Id. at 902–03.  
 95. Id. at 903 (quoting ANCSA § 7).  
 96. Id. at 902.  
 97. Id. at 903.  
 98. Id. at 904.  
 99. Id.  
 100. See id. at 904–06.  
 101. See id. at 905–06; see also ANCSA § 19, 43 U.S.C. § 1618 (2012) (discussing 
villages that opted out and received larger land entitlements in fee).  
 102. Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. at 906.  
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The court again turned to the legislative history for guidance and 
found several strong arguments for excluding Natives enrolled to 19(b) 
villages, in particular that “Congress attempted to create equality in the 
operation of the provisions of ANCSA where that was feasible.”103 But the 
court ultimately eschewed the historical arguments, instead holding that 
the “clear statutory language, and the fact that the members of section 
19(b) villages are still within the framework of ANCSA” required the 
counting of those Natives for the purposes of section 6(c) and Section 
7(i).104 
In Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp.,105 the Ninth Circuit 
addressed whether “Native members of villages which elected to take 
title to reserve lands in lieu of all other benefits under the Act may be 
counted by the Regional Corporations for purposes of calculating their 
proportional shares of the [Alaska Native] Fund.”106 As noted above, the 
formula for distribution depended in part on how many Alaska Natives 
were enrolled to each regional corporation and in part on the total number 
of enrolled Alaska Natives statewide. Slight variations in the numbers 
mattered greatly because, as the court noted “$962,500,000 will ultimately 
be deposited [in the Alaska Native Fund] for distribution to the Regional 
Corporations . . . in quarterly installments . . . according to the ‘relative 
numbers of Natives enrolled in each region.”107 The court recognized that 
its disposition of the issue would directly impact calculations of the 
proportionate share for each regional corporation under Section 7(i) and 
village corporations under section 7(j).108 
As with all the other early Section 7(i) cases, the court found that the 
language used in the Act was subject to multiple interpretations and 
turned to the legislative history, finding “Congress intended the regions 
to share as nearly as possible on an equal basis, and did not intend to 
sanction disparate distribution of the Fund based on unforeseen semantic 
problems.”109 The court therefore concluded that “the term ‘Native’ in 
certain portions of the Act was intended to refer to stockholders of the 
Regional Corporations” and not to include Natives enrolled to village 
corporations which elected to acquire title to their former reserves.110 
In Aleut III, the court decided two issues: whether sand and gravel 
was a surface or subsurface resource and whether the term “all revenues” 
 
 103. Id. at 905.  
 104. Id. at 906.  
 105. 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 954 (1978).  
 106. Id. at 494.  
 107. Id. at 493 (quoting ANCSA § 6, 43 U.S.C. § 1605(c) (2012)).  
 108. Id. at 494 n.7.  
 109. Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 568 F.2d 491, 494 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 110. See id.  
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used in Section 7(i) meant gross or net revenues.111 The sand and gravel 
issue was critically important for a couple of reasons: first, for split estate 
lands—those in which a village corporation owns the surface estate and a 
regional corporation owns the subsurface—the issue defined which type 
of entity owned an important and economically valuable resource; 
second, if sand and gravel was a subsurface resource, revenue derived 
from the resource could be subject to Section 7(i) sharing.112 
The court approached the issue by first addressing the split-estate 
lands. The court reviewed the legislative history and found that there 
Congress had used differing language regarding the subsurface estate. In 
some cases, the bills provided that regional corporations would receive 
“all minerals covered by mining and mineral leasing laws” and in other 
bills, including the final ANCSA, regional corporations received 
“subsurface estate”.113 The court found persuasive the argument that if 
sand and gravel were a subsurface resource, it would render the surface 
estate worthless in the case of development of the resource because “sand 
and gravel only can be extracted through open pit mining which totally 
destroys the surface.”114 Ultimately, the court held that for split-estate 
lands “sand and gravel are part of the surface estate and are not subject 
to revenue sharing under Section 7(i).”115 
Turning to the case of regional corporation lands where the 
corporation owns the surface and subsurface estates, the court found “[a] 
somewhat different situation.”116 It noted the purpose of Section 7(i) was 
“to achieve a rough equality in assets among all the Natives” and that 
sand and gravel was an important and valuable resource, especially when 
“located near one of the developing centers [in Alaska].”117 Thus, while 
acknowledging the “somewhat anomalous” result, the court held that for 
fee regional corporation lands, sand and gravel were a part of the 
subsurface estate and subject to Section 7(i) sharing.118 
With regard to the concept of whether “all revenues” referred to 
gross or net revenues, the court began by reviewing the Doyon, Ltd. v. 
NANA Regional Corp. decision and “accept[ed] much of the reasoning of 
 
 111. Aleut III, 421 F.Supp. 862, 864 (D. Alaska 1976), rev’d in part sub nom. 
Doyon, Ltd. v. Bristol Bay Native Corp., 569 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 112. See id. at 864 (discussing the importance of the issue in determining which 
corporation receives the patents and revenues). 
 113. Id. at 864–65 (quoting H.R. 7039, 92d Cong. (1971) and H.R. 10367, 92d 
Cong. (1971)). 
 114. Id. at 866. 
 115. Id. This holding was later reversed. Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 
588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1978). 
 116. Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. at 867. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
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Judge Gasch on this issue.”119 Building on the decision of the Doyon court, 
the court reviewed the legislative history of ANCSA and noted that the 
House bill, H.R. 10367, “spoke only in terms of ‘revenues’” but also 
required 100% of resource revenue be shared.120 The court found it 
“extremely unlikely” that Congress would require a corporation to share 
100% of the revenue and absorb all of the expenses associated with the 
resource revenue.121  This result also matched the Senate bill which 
“specifically referred to ‘net revenues.’”122 
In Aleut IV, the court decided the relatively straightforward issue of 
whether ASRC should be required to sequester funds in secure and liquid 
investments during the pendency of the litigation involving Section 
7(i).123 The court began by agreeing with the parties that Alaska state law 
controlled the decision as to available remedies.124 Accordingly, 
recognizing the “harsh nature” of the requested remedy and that Alaska 
statute provided a “complex statutory scheme” for such remedies, the 
court held that the common law remedy of sequestration was preempted 
and unavailable to the plaintiffs.125 
Two years later, in 1980, the court issued another order (Aleut V), 
reaching the merits of revenues generated by ASRC related to oil and gas 
exploration on its lands.126 There, ASRC had received approximately $30 
million from oil and gas companies for the rights to explore for and 
produce oil and gas from ANCSA subsurface estate owned by ASRC.127 
ASRC claimed that $13.9 million of the revenue received was not related 
to its subsurface and therefore was not shareable under Section 7(i).128 In 
rejecting ASRC’s arguments, the court noted that it had “previously 
interpreted section 7(i) broadly so as to further the section’s ‘obvious 
egalitarian purpose.’”129 
The court made several important rulings that carry through to other 
Section 7(i) litigation and the Settlement Agreement. First, it held that 
 
 119. Id. at 868 (citing Doyon v. NANA, Civ. No. 1531-74 (D.D.C. 1976)). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (quoting Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, S. 35, 92d Cong., §9(j)(1) 
(1971)). Presciently, the court noted: “Certainly adoption of a net position will 
increase the litigation and complicate the proceedings in this case and those that 
may follow on the disbursement of 7(i) funds.”  Aleut III, 421 F. Supp. at 869. 
 123. Aleut IV, 424 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D. Alaska 1976), aff’d sub nom. Chugach 
Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 124. Id. at 398–99.  
 125. Id. at 400.  
 126. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut V), 484 F. Supp. 482 (D. 
Alaska 1980).  
 127. Id. at 483–84.  
 128. Id. at 484.  
 129. Id. (quoting Aleut I, 410 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Alaska 1976)).  
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“revenues received by a regional corporation that are attributable to, 
directly related to, or generated by the acquisition of an interest in the 
corporation’s subsurface estate are revenues subject to the sharing 
provisions of section 7(i).”130 
Second, the court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that 
revenues received are subject to Section 7(i) when “received under an 
agreement, or a group of agreements that are regarded as one transaction, 
which has as its ultimate object the acquisition of an interest in the 
subsurface estate.”131 In order to rebut the presumption, the resource 
owning regional corporation would have the burden of proving that the 
consideration received for certain elements of the transaction are for non-
Section 7(i) assets owned by the corporation, and “that the consideration 
has actual value.”132 
Third, the court held that it was not bound by the contracting parties’ 
“allocation of revenues to a particular element of consideration” in its 
determination of whether the revenue is subject to Section 7(i) sharing.133 
Instead, the court noted that it “must examine the claimed elements of 
consideration to determine whether they have substance.”134 
The court next addressed ASRC’s specific arguments: that revenues 
received were for reasonable damages to the surface estate, liquidated 
damages for unreasonable damages to the surface estate, and 
compensation for indirect damage to the subsistence lifestyle and culture 
of ASRC’s Native shareholders.135 With regard to damage to the surface 
estate, the court found that any revenues received for such damage was 
directly related to the subsurface as “[a]n oil and gas lease carries with it 
the right to use as much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary to 
exploit the oil and gas.”136 The court also rejected ASRC’s allocation for 
liquidated damages characterizing the argument as an “after the fact 
rationalization” because the agreements did not contain liquidated 
damages clauses.137 
Finally, distinguishing between the corporation as a legal person and 
its shareholders, the court held that “a claim against the oil companies for 
damage to [ASRC’s Native shareholders’] subsistence life-style and 
 
 130. Id. at 485.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id. at 485–86.  
 133. Id. at 486.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 487.  
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culture” was not a claim held by ASRC because those “interests are not 
held by the regional corporation.”138 
In Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.,139 a village 
corporation sued the regional corporation for its region claiming that it 
was entitled to fifty percent of all net income from the regional 
corporation.140 This claim was in addition to the undisputed right to 
receive its share of the fifty percent of the revenue received by ASRC 
pursuant to Section 7(i) and its proportionate share of not less than ten 
percent of the funds received by ASRC from the Alaska Native Fund.141 
Specifically at issue was whether Section 7(j) required regional 
corporations to share with the village corporations and at-large 
shareholders in its region fifty percent of its net income derived from its 
business activity unrelated to resource development of its own lands.142 
Several regional corporations participated as amici curiae, asserting that 
being forced to share fifty percent of income not related to subsurface 
resources “would seriously undercut, if not destroy, amici’s continued 
existence as functioning business organizations.”143 
The court found the language of the Act to be ambiguous and turned 
to the legislative history.144 The House and Senate Conference Committee 
specifically addressed the distribution of “50 percent of all revenues 
received from the subsurface estate,” but also provided “[t]his provision 
does not apply to revenues received by the Regional Corporation from 
their investment in business activities.”145 Finding this to be persuasive, 
along with additional language from Section 7(j) excluding the landless 
thirteenth regional corporation from making any type of distribution to 
other regional or village corporations from its business activities, the 
court held that regional corporations were not required to distribute net 
income not related to timber and subsurface resources to village 
corporations.146 
 
 138. Id.  
 139. 517 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alaska 1981).  
 140. Id. at 1255–56, 1258.  
 141. Id. at 1258.  
 142. See id. (“The heart of the present dispute is whether the words ‘funds from 
such sources,’ used in the second sentence, mean that fifty percent of ‘all other net 
income’ (first sentence) must be distributed, in perpetuity, among the Village 
Corporations and at-large stockholders.”).  
 143. See Memorandum of Doyon as Amici Curiae Supporting Defendants at 2, 
Ukpeagvik Inupiat Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1255 (D. Alaska 
1981) (No. A81-326 Civil) (on file with author).  
 144. See Ukpeagvik, 517 F. Supp. at 1259–60.  
 145. Id. at 1260 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-746, at 36 (1971) (Conf. Rep.), as 
reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2192, 2247, 2249).  
 146. Ukpeagvik, 517 F. Supp. at 1261.  
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In its concluding paragraph, the court noted the regional 
corporations’ “need for a strong economic foundation to build upon.”147 
It found that the requirement to pay fifty percent of the regional 
corporations’ net income and fifty percent of their retained Section 7(i) 
revenues to village corporations and at-large stockholders “would erode 
the economic strength” and “weaken the foundation for the settlement” 
contrary to the intent of the Congress in ANCSA.148 
In Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd.,149 the Ninth Circuit addressed 
an important question that arose as soon as ANCSA passed: whether 
sand, gravel, and rock resources were a part of the subsurface estate and 
therefore subject to Section 7(i) revenue sharing.150 As with other early 
challenges and litigation, the language of Section 7(i) itself did not 
provide direct guidance on the issue.151 The district court in the Aleut 
litigation had only muddled the matter further by anomalously providing 
for differing definitions of “subsurface estate” depending on whether the 
land was held entirely by regional corporations or whether the fee was 
shared by the regional and village corporations.152 
The Ninth Circuit began by noting that “[n]o party argued for this 
result below.”153 Instead, all parties—which included all twelve regional 
corporations—agreed that “the interpretation of ‘subsurface estate’ must 
be the same regardless of who owns the surface estate.”154 Accordingly, 
the court turned to legislative history and found “instructive” several 
reports from government authorities—which all referenced sand, gravel, 
and crushed stone in describing subsurface estates—to support its 
conclusion that sand and gravel are part of the subsurface estate.155 The 
court also found supportive evidence in an opinion letter of the Associate 
Solicitor of the Department of the Interior and a subsequent ANCSA 
amendment  conveying the subsurface estate of certain lands to Koniag, 
Inc.156 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ended one of the most litigated and 
important early questions of ANCSA Section 7(i) by holding that sand 
and gravel are part of the subsurface estate.157 
 
 147. Id. at 1262. 
 148. Id.  
 149. 588 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1978).  
 150. Id. at 724–25.  
 151. Id. at 725–26.  
 152. Id. at 725.  
 153. Id. at 726.  
 154. See id.  
 155. Id. at 729–32 (emphasis added).  
 156. Id. at 729–30.  
 157. See id. at 732.  
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Following all of the litigation during the first few years of 
implementing ANCSA, the regional corporations were growing weary.158 
In 1976, Doyon Vice President Tim Wallis summarized the challenges for 
Alaska Native Corporations in implementing Section 7(i) before the 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs: 
The problems involved in implementing section 7(i) are many 
and complex. Virtually all the Regional Corporations have or 
will become involved in expensive and protracted litigation. In 
addition to the inherent disincentives involved in separating 
economic benefits from responsibility for resource development, 
the uncertainties surrounding section 7(i) compound the 
disincentive to economic development. . . . 
[T]he uncertainties of section 7(i) are frustrating the 
accomplishment of the purpose of the act [ANCSA]. One of the 
primary purposes of the Act is to effectuate a rapid settlement, 
with minimal litigation, thereby creating a climate in which the 
Natives can expeditiously develop their resources and achieve 
economic independence. 
Instead, section 7(i) creates a lawyers’ and accountants’ dream 
and a Regional Corporation’s nightmare. It will be literally 
decades before the issues are completely resolved. The cost, both 
in terms of dollars and acrimony between the Regional 
Corporations, will be substantial. The section results in the 
diversion of resources which should be put to more beneficial 
use. It also makes impossible long-range corporate planning and 
is a disincentive to economic development.159 
Doyon’s board, in fact, passed a resolution stating the corporation 
was “in favor of the repeal of Section 7(i)” because it was “expending 
 
 158. It is important to remember that there was other litigation between the 
regional corporations, between regional corporations and the United States, and 
between regional corporations and the State of Alaska regarding other ANCSA 
issues. E.g., Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians of Alaska v. Chugach 
Native Ass’n, 502 F.2d 1323 (9th Cir. 1974) (case between regional corporations 
involving boundary disputes); Ahtna, Inc. v. Doyon, Ltd., Civ. No. A-198-72 (D. 
Alaska 1973) (case between regional corporations involving boundary disputes); 
Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. v. Morton, Civ. No. 73-1563 (D.D.C. 1974) (case between 
regional corporation and United States regarding land selection regulations); 
Seldovia Native Ass’n, Inc., 2 ANCAB 1, 1, 10–11 (U.S. Dep’t of Interior June 9, 
1977) (appeal of an ANCSA § 14(a) decision); see also Linxwiler, supra note 8, at § 
12.03[4][a] (“Like so many other provisions of ANCSA, the land withdrawal, 
selection, and conveyance provisions were complex, ambiguous, and heavily 
litigated. Much of this litigation was brought by the State of Alaska.”). 
 159. Implementation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong. 90–91 (1976) (statement of Tim 
Wallis, Vice President of Doyon).  
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large amounts of money for litigation to resolve the uncertainties of 
Section 7(i)” and that the uncertainty “severely handicaps a region in 
developing its resources and serves as a divisive element in cooperation 
among the regions.”160 
Similarly, in a memorandum to the Doyon board of directors a few 
years later, Doyon’s outside attorney, Arthur Lazarus, summarized the 
Aleut litigation and decisions, “The Aleut case, however, did not provide 
a happy solution to the Section 7(i) problem. Instead, the litigation proved 
to be time-consuming, expensive and, most important, a significant drain 
upon the talent and energy of senior management in all the Corporations 
involved.”161 Doyon was not alone in its litigation fatigue, and the 
ANCSA regional corporations soon turned to settlement discussions for 
Section 7(i) disagreements. 
But before a global settlement could be reached, several village 
corporations sued, attempting to insert themselves into both the litigation 
among the regions and the settlement agreements in Aleut Corp. v. Tyonek 
Native Corp.162 As late as the eve of settlement, five village corporations 
sought to intervene to protect their interests in the sand and gravel 
resources that were subject to the Aleut litigation and the settlement 
discussions.163 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the joinder denial as untimely, holding 
that “intervention on the eve of settlement following several years of 
litigation was not timely and that to permit it would have prejudiced the 
rights of the regions impermissibly.”164 The court noted that it made its 
decision assuming that “the regions did not represent the [interests of the] 
villages in the section 7(i) litigation” and that the villages would have an 
ability to later litigate the distinct but related issue of the ownership of 
sand and gravel resources on ANCSA split estate lands.165 
 
 160. Resolution of Doyon Bd., No. 76-13 (Mar. 19, 1976) (on file with author).  
 161. Memorandum from Arthur Lazarus, Jr., P.C., Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver 
& Kampelman LLP, to Doyon Bd. of Dirs. 2 (July 9, 1982) (discussing proposed 
settlement of Section 7(i) litigation) (on file with author). See also FED.-STATE LAND 
USE PLANNING COMM’N FOR ALASKA, ALASKA NATIVE CLAIMS SETTLEMENT ACT 
1971–1979 110 (1979) (“Additional 7(i) issues and interpretations will continue to 
surface and cause problems for Native corporations. . . . [T]he problems described 
above underscore the language difficulties and absence of instructive legislative 
history which have made implementation of this section difficult.”).  
 162. 725 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984).  
 163. Id. at 528.  
 164. Id. at 530.  
 165. Id. at 529–30. The issue of the split estate ownership and use of sand and 
gravel resources arose later in Koniag, Inc. v. Koncor Forest Res., 39 F.3d 991 (9th 
Cir. 1994).  
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THE ANCSA SECTION 7(I) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The leaders of the ANCSA regional corporations recognized the 
futility of constant and ongoing litigation. By the late 1970s this realization 
led to the discussion of a comprehensive settlement agreement.166 
In 1981, Sealaska Corporation invited the other regional corporations 
to a meeting in Warm Springs, Oregon to discuss settlement of the 
protracted litigation between the regions regarding Section 7(i).167 
Sealaska observed that “[t]he stakes are very high,” but “the litigation 
ought to be resolved by the affected corporations rather than by the court, 
if at all possible.”168 All twelve regions participated and sent their 
presidents and attorney representatives.169 
Following the Warm Springs meeting, teams of attorneys, 
accountants, and other experts began working on the settlement 
agreement.170 The task was not easy. As the Special Master appointed by 
the Aleut court later reported: 
By November 1981, however, the early momentum toward 
settlement did not seem sufficient to overcome a number of 
remaining hurdles. An initial draft of a settlement agreement 
was something of a chimera: at several critical points it contained 
alternative approaches which affected the construction of the 
balance of the proposed agreement.171 
But the group worked hard over the winter of 1981–82 through a 
series of drafting committee meetings, and six settlement conferences that 
involved “dozens of Corporation executives, attorneys, financial advisors 
and other experts.”172 
On June 29, 1982, a final settlement agreement was reached among 
the twelve regions, subject to the ratification by each corporation’s 
respective board of directors.173 The document was 121 pages long with 
its two appendices.174 In essence, the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement 
“represent[ed] an effort by the Regional Corporations to correct the 
deficiencies of ANCSA by a detailed agreement in order to render 
 
 166.  Briefing of Doyon Bd. of Dirs., ANCSA 7(i) Historical Synopsis 5 (Aug. 
20, 1981) (on file with author).  
 167. See id. at 6.  
 168. Id.  
 169. Interview with Margaret Brown, supra note 9.   
 170. See Special Master Report, supra note 28, at 12.  
 171. Id. at 11.  
 172. Id. at 12.  
 173. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35.  
 174. Id.  
33.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:00 PM 
2016 $40 MILLION PER WORD AND COUNTING 255 
possible commercially viable resource development without litigation . . 
. .”175 
Doyon held a board meeting on September 24, 1982, where its board 
considered and approved by resolution the Section 7(i) Settlement 
Agreement.176 Each of the other eleven regional corporations also ratified 
the Settlement Agreement.177 
The Settlement Agreement, broadly described, was structured to 
define what revenues were subject to Section 7(i) sharing, what expenses 
were allowed to be taken against such revenues, and the administrative 
procedures necessary to annually administer the program among the 
regional corporations.178 The article defining revenues subject to sharing 
is structured, unsurprisingly, to address many of the concepts earlier 
litigated including the timing and recognition of revenue, non-cash 
revenue, revenue received prior to patent, borrowing, reimbursements or 
credits for costs, and affiliated entity transactions.179 The Settlement 
Agreement also adheres to the early decision by the courts to distinguish 
between active and passive revenue and the allowable deductions against 
revenue in each case.180 
The Settlement Agreement broke new ground in that it defined 
procedures for calculating distributable revenues using either itemized 
allowable costs or a “standard deduction.”181 It also set up a fairly 
extensive compliance mechanism requiring annual reporting by each 
 
 175.  James D. Linxwiler, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act: The First 
Twenty Years, 38 ANNUAL ROCKY MTN. L. INST. 28 (1992). See also Special Master 
Report, supra note 28, at 1 (“[T]he agreement substitutes a Uniform System of 
Accounting and Reporting for the present chaos of twelve Regional Corporations 
applying disparate, though equally defensible, accounting methods for 
determining net revenues available for distribution.”).  
 176. Resolution of Doyon Bd., No. 82-53 (Sept. 24, 1982) (on file with author).  
 177. See Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., Civ. No. A75-53, at 5 (D. Alaska 
June 3, 1983) (order dismissing case following settlement) (on file with author). 
 178. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 15, 43, 71.  
 179. Id. at 15–27. See Aleut I, 410 F. Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Alaska 1976) (subjecting 
revenue received prior to patent to sharing); Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D. 
Alaska 1976) (holding that revenue includes “benefits of every sort so long as such 
are received . . . in exchange for rights granted in the timber resources and 
subsurface estate received by a regional corporation pursuant to ANCSA”); Aleut 
V, 484 F. Supp. 482, 484–85 (D. Alaska 1980) (defining revenue subject to sharing 
broadly); Doyon v. NANA, Civil No. 1531-74 (D.D.C. May 5, 1976) (on file with 
author) (stating revenue includes consideration of any kind [whether] received 
directly or indirectly).  
 180. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 45–60 (defining allowable 
passive cost deductions and allowable active cost deductions). See Doyon v. 
NANA, No. 1531-74, at 9, 11 (defining generation of revenue by active and passive 
landowners and allowing netting of some expenses from revenue, only those 
“which are directly related to the production of § 7(i) revenues”).  
 181. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 68–71.  
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regional corporation to all eleven other regions, the sharing of certain 
records and financial reports among the regions, and audit procedures.182 
The Agreement also provided that arbitration would be the sole dispute 
resolution mechanism for all disputes related to Section 7(i).183 The 
Settlement Agreement also had relatively extensive provisions to settle 
and true up past transactions between the regions.184 
The Settlement Agreement has been amended twice. In 1990, 
following several years of arbitration regarding Sealaska timber 
resources,185 the regions unanimously agreed to amend the Agreement. 
The amendment deleted Article II, Section 9 from the original Agreement 
and added a dozen new pages of allowable active 7(i) costs to Article III, 
Section 3 of the Agreement.186 
In 2001, the regions unanimously agreed to amend Article II, Section 
2(b) of the Settlement Agreement regarding resource contract 
scholarships for shareholders or members of their families.187 The 
amendment allows regional corporations to exclude from Gross Section 
7(i) Revenues up to $250,000 per year in scholarships paid directly by a 
third party as part of a contract or lease related to 7(i) resources.188 
Alternatively, the regional corporation may provide up to $250,000 in 
scholarships directly from such revenues it receives from a third party 
related to Section 7(i) resources.189 
The Settlement Agreement has not been amended since 2001. This is 
due, in part, to a requirement of unanimous approval by all twelve 
regional corporations for any amendment to the Agreement.190 
SECTION 7(I) SINCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The Settlement Agreement had its intended effect and greatly 
reduced the amount of litigation involving the regional corporations and 
Section 7(i). It also has had some unintended consequences, discussed 
 
 182. Id. at 71–84.  
 183. Id. at 84; but see id. at 84 (declining to apply arbitration requirement to 
federal, state, or other income taxes under Section 7(i) of the Agreement).  
 184. See id. at 91–100, 121 (providing agreed-upon gross revenues and 
deductions for past fiscal years).  
 185. The Sealaska arbitration proceedings are discussed infra.  
 186. See First Amendment to the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 22, 
1990) (amending Article III, § 3) (on file with author). 
 187. See Amendment No. 99-1 to the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 
27, 2001) (amending Article II, Section 2) (on file with author). 
 188. Id. at 1–2.   
 189. Id.  
 190. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 108.  
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below, including almost a decade of annual disputes that were the subject 
of several arbitration cases between the regional corporations.191 
Section 7(i) as a Deterrent to Natural Resource Exploration and 
Development 
One of the most significant and long-lasting criticisms of the 
Settlement Agreement, and Section 7(i) generally, is that Section 7(i) acts 
as a deterrent to natural resource exploration and development by 
regional corporations on their own lands.192 The deterrent arises from the 
one-sided nature of Section 7(i) and the Settlement Agreement, whereby 
a regional corporation must share seventy percent of the revenue it 
derives but has much less ability to pass on or share with other regions 
expenses incurred in unsuccessful exploration efforts. 
The discussion of this issue is current.193 But Native corporations 
also recognized the disincentive in the early 1970s. For example, regional 
corporation Doyon hosted a meeting with its region’s village corporations 
in 1975 where the topic was raised by Doyon’s president, John Sackett: 
I’d like to show you what Doyon’s problem is if we make money 
in Resource Development. I’d like to run through an example of 
what happens if we make a net profit . . . . The first thing I would 
have to do is from a little section of the Act which says that we 
have to share 70/30 with the other regions. . . . [T]hat is one of 
the most frustrating parts of the Act. Why should we do 
anything out there since we have to give it all away to 
everybody?194 
 
 191. The Settlement Agreement subjects all disputes involving Section 7(i) 
between the regional corporations to binding arbitration. Id. at 84.  
 192. See, e.g., Kathleen McCoy, Hometown U: How Long Will Alaska Native 
Corporations Last? And How Will They Change?, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS (Apr. 24, 
2016), http://www.adn.com/article/20160424/hometown-u-how-long-will- 
alaska-native-corporations-last-and-how-will-they-change (noting one 
respondent to a University of Alaska study characterized Section 7(i)’s sharing as 
an “excessive tax that should be closer to a 50-50 split”). 
 193. See, e.g., Presentation by Aaron M. Schutt to the Alaska Native Law  
Section of the Alaska Bar (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.lbblawyers.com/ancsa/ 
7(i)%20Discussion%20(12_12_07).pdf (discussing impediments to resource 
exploration and development caused by Section 7(i)). 
 194. Transcript of Doyon/Village Meeting of Aug. 28–29, 1975 at 3 (on file with 
author). See also Aaron M. Schutt, ANCSA Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement: 
Impediments to Mineral Development, Presentation to Alaska Native Bar 
Section (Dec. 12, 2007), http://www.lbblawyers.com/ancsa/7(i)%20Discussion% 
20(12_12_07).pdf (describing disincentives to landowning regions regarding self-
financed exploration under the Settlement Agreement). Contra Andrew Guy, 
Donlin Gold Project Will Improve Lives in Kuskokwim Country, ALASKA DISPATCH 
NEWS (Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.adn.com/article/20160213/donlin-gold-
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In some relevant respects, the Section 7(i) sharing requirement is 
analogous to a multi-owner situation in hydrocarbon development, in 
which: 
any co-owner may develop hydrocarbons on jointly owned 
lands without the consent of other co-owners. In such 
circumstances, the “operating” co-owner assumes the total risk 
of any dry holes, but must account to the other co-owners for the 
net profits of production—typically on a well-by-well basis, after 
recovering out of revenues the non-operating co-owners’ pro-
rata share of drilling, completion, and day-to-day operating 
costs.195 
The analogy for a regional corporation is that it may develop a sub-
surface resource, but in the event of an unsuccessful exploration effort, it 
may not pass on the pro-rata costs of exploration to the other regional 
corporations. In the successful case, it is subject to the seventy percent 
sharing burden of Section 7(i) less allowable deductions under the 
Settlement Agreement.196 Thus, like a joint owner of hydrocarbons 
considering exploration efforts, there are strong incentives for regional 
corporations exploring their own lands. In the case of a joint hydrocarbon 
owner, the incentive is to get the pre-approval and participation of co-
owners prior to commencing exploration efforts. In the case of a regional 
corporation, there is a large incentive to have exploration conducted by 
third parties who bear exploration risk but also get full value of a 
successful exploration program. 
Post-Settlement Litigation and Issues 
The Settlement Agreement eliminated much of the previously 
annual litigation between the regions, but it did not resolve all issues 
related to 7(i) and 7(j). In particular, village corporations were not parties 
to the Settlement Agreement and in two related cases discussed below, 
village corporations filed suit to resolve the issue of whether net operating 
loss tax benefits were subject to sharing under Sections 7(i) and 7(j). In 
addition, there was a period of years of disputes following the signing of 
 
project-will-improve-lives-kuskokwim-country (“Through ANCSA’s 7(i) and 7(j) 
revenue sharing provisions, the Donlin Gold project will provide revenue to all 
Alaska Native regional and village corporations, including Calista. The Donlin 
Gold project offers an opportunity to satisfy the intent of ANCSA to benefit all 
Native corporations . . . .”). 
 195. Christopher S. Kulander, Old Faves & New Raves: How Case Law Has Affected 
Form Joint Operating Agreements (Part One), 1 OIL & GAS, NAT. RES. & ENERGY J. 1, 
7–8 (2015) (citing Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. Allen, 2 F.2d 566, 574 (8th Cir. 1924)). 
 196. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 9. 
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the Settlement Agreement that resulted in several arbitration cases being 
filed. And there are new and emerging issues related to Section 7(i). 
In Bay View, Inc. ex rel. AK Native Village Corps. v. Ahtna, Inc. (Bay 
View I),197 a class of village corporations brought suit claiming that 
Sections 7(i) and 7(j) required ten regional corporations to share proceeds 
from the sale of net operating losses (NOLs).198 The Bay View I court 
described NOLs as “a tax shelter device whereby a profitable company 
buys the losses of an unprofitable company and sets those losses off 
against its own taxable income.”199 Congress prohibited the sale of NOLs 
generally in the 1984 Deficit Reduction Act, but Senator Ted Stevens 
“managed to carve out an exception for Alaska native corporations, 
authorizing them to sell their NOLs.”200 Due to the combination of the 
unique procedural rules applicable to ANCSA natural resources, bad 
management and investments by regional corporations, and a crash in 
timber prices, ten regional corporations sold $1.5 billion in losses, 
generating $425 million.201 The ten regions agreed not to share the NOL 
revenue under Section 7(i) as a part of a Mutual Assistance Agreement.202 
A class action lawsuit by village corporations and at-large shareholders 
against the ten regional corporations ensued.203 
The Bay View I plaintiffs claimed that the NOLs were largely derived 
from losses attributable to natural resources subject to Section 7(i), 
therefore the NOLs should be subject to 7(i).204 While the appeal was 
pending, Congress amended ANCSA to make clear that NOLs were not 
subject to Section 7(i) sharing.205 On appeal, Bay View argued that the 
1995 amendments were an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth 
Amendment and that the taking was not for a “public use” and thus in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment.206 
The Ninth Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment claim was 
premature given that Bay View had a remedy under the Tucker Act and 
could sue the United States in the Federal Court of Claims.207 With regard 
to the “public use” argument, the court held that “assuming the 1995 
 
 197. 105 F.3d 1281 (9th Cir. 1997).   
 198. Id. at 1284.  
 199. Id. at 1283. 
 200. Id. (citing Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 60(b)(5), 98 Stat. 494, 579 (1984)). 
 201. Id. at 1283–84. 
 202. Id. at 1284. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See id. (citing Pub. L. No. 104-42, § 109, 109 Stat. 353, 357 (1995) (codified 
as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i)(2)) (“For purposes of this subsection, the term 
‘revenues’ does not include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses 
incurred or credits earned by a Regional Corporation.”). 
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 1285. 
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Amendment constituted a taking, Congress had a rational reason for 
deciding it was for public use . . . [to] ‘avoid future costly litigation.’”208 
In Bay View, Inc. v. United States (Bay View II),209 the Federal Circuit 
addressed the Tucker Act claim of the Bay View plaintiffs.210 Bay View 
claimed “a taking, a breach of trust, and a breach of contract.”211 The 
Court of Federal Claims dismissed Bay View’s case, holding that “the 
1995 amendment was not a taking because the revenues received from 
NOL sales were not revenues ‘from the timber resources and subsurface 
estate’”; ANCSA did not create a trust relationship between village 
corporations and the United States; and ANCSA was not a contract or 
treaty.212 The court elaborated on the dispute about the nature of NOL 
revenue: 
Accurately characterized, the NOL proceeds are a product of the 
tax status of the Regional Corporations, not the product of 
timber resources. Thus, applying the terms of ANCSA, the NOL 
sales generated revenues from the sales of financial interests 
related to tax status, not from tangible timber or mineral 
estates.213 
Finally, in Oliver v. Sealaska Corp.,214 an individual at-large 
shareholder brought suit contending that “the § 7(i) settlement 
improperly deprive[d] him, other at-large shareholders, and the Village 
Corporations of monies due them from revenue sharing under 
ANCSA.”215 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court decision holding 
that “nothing in the text of the revenue-sharing provision creates an 
express private right of action to enforce the section’s mandates” and 
finding that the facts did not support an implied private right of action.216 
Arbitration under the Settlement Agreement 
Since the Settlement Agreement was signed in 1982, there have been 
several disputes resolved by arbitration between regional corporations 
regarding Section 7(i). The first set of arbitration cases related to Sealaska 
timber resources. 
 
 208. Id. at 1286 (quoting 141 CONG. REC. S11345 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995)). 
 209. Bay View, Inc. v. United States (Bay View II), 278 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 210. Id. at 1265.  
 211. Id. at 1263. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 1264. 
 214. 192 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 215. Id. at 1223. 
 216. Id. at 1223–25. 
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Sealaska timber arbitration 
 
The first arbitration case involved timber resources owned by 
Sealaska.217 There, the Aleut, Ahtna, Bristol Bay, Calista, Cook Inlet, 
Doyon, and Koniag corporations “claim[ed] that Sealaska had 
understated its shareable revenues for the 3 1/4 year period [from 
January 1, 1982 through March 31, 1985] by nearly $20 million.”218 This 
was the first major test of the Settlement Agreement. 
The dispute arose over the “appropriate valuation date upon which 
to base the fair market value” of harvested timber Section 7(i) resources.219 
Sealaska was actively developing its timber resources and argued that 
“fair market value of a log should be based on the log’s value at or near 
the time it actually is sold,” whereas the other regional corporations 
argued that the “log’s value should be determined as of January 1 of the 
year in which it is harvested.”220 The issue was contested in a multi-year 
arbitration proceeding that ended with a four-week hearing in 1988, 
where a majority of the arbitration panel found in favor of the claimants 
and against Sealaska and ordered payment of an additional $17 million 
under Section 7(i).221 
Sealaska initiated litigation in federal district court, filing for a 
preliminary injunction while simultaneously asking the court to reopen 
the earlier Aleut cases.222 Meanwhile, the prevailing regional corporations 
filed a case in Alaska state court, Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp.,223 to enforce 
the arbitration award. Sealaska removed the state court case to federal 
district court and all of the issues were decided together with the federal 
court upholding the binding nature of the arbitration provisions of the 
Settlement Agreement and rejecting Sealaska’s other arguments which 
attempted to relitigate issues addressed in the arbitration.224 
In February 1989, the Sealaska board met and “authorized payment 
totaling $14,865,000 to eleven other regional . . . corporations” to end the 
disputes relate to the 1982 to 1985 timber.225 Sealaska issued a news 
release which stated, in part: 
 
 217. Aleut Corp. v. Sealaska Corp., AAA No. 75199002386 (Prelim. Op. of 
Arbitrators) (Aug. 11, 1988) (McGough, Arb.) (on file with author); id. (Decision 
and Award of Arbitrators) (Nov. 23, 1988) (McGough, Arb.) (on file with author).  
 218.  Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp. (Aleut VI), No. A88-515 Civil, at 7 
(Jan. 24, 1989) (on file with author). 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. at 7–8. 
 221. Id. at 8. 
 222. Id. at 2–3. 
 223. No. 3AN-87-3652 (3d Dist. 1989).  
 224. Aleut VI, No. A88-515 Civil, at 9–20. 
 225. Press Release, Sealaska Corp., Sealaska Corporation Will Not Appeal 7(i) 
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Because of the uncertainty and high risk associated with the 
January 1 valuation requirement the Sealaska Corporation 
Board of Directors has directed that Sealaska cease the active 
harvest of ANCSA timber until and unless an agreement can be 
reached among the Regional Corporations that allows a rational 
and prudent approach to timber valuation.226 
Later in 1989, the regional corporations again expressed their 
weariness of the constant and draining battles involving Section 7(i)—in 
this case the annual arbitrations. Sealaska proposed a settlement 
“amending the Section 7(i) Agreement by adopting an in-place value 
approach to measuring revenues from the active development of 
Sealaska’s Section 7(i) timber.”227 The regional corporations all agreed to 
the new methodology and amended the Settlement Agreement in 1990.228 
Chandler Lake land exchange arbitration 
 
Another post-Settlement Agreement arbitration involved a land 
exchange between Arctic Slope Regional Corporation (ASRC) and the 
National Park Service called the Chandler Lake Land Exchange.229 The 
exchange, completed in 1983 just after the ratification of the Settlement 
Agreement, traded 101,272 acres of surface estate owned by ASRC within 
Gates of the Arctic National Park for 92,160 acres of subsurface estate 
within the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.230 
The exchange was controversial for a number of reasons, not the 
least of which was the avoidance of Section 7(i) under the Settlement 
Agreement. Under the Settlement Agreement, “[i]f surface is traded for 
surface, or for subsurface, or for surface and subsurface, revenues from 
the property received in trade shall not be subject to sharing under this 
Agreement or Section 7(i).”231 
In 1986, Aleut Corporation and Bristol Bay Native Corporation 
 
Arbitration Ruling, at 1 (Feb. 9, 1989) (on file with author). 
 226. Id. at 3. 
 227. Byron Mallott, CEO of Sealaska Corp., Letter to Morris Thompson, 
President of Doyon (Mar. 30, 1989) (on file with author).  
 228. First Amendment to the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement (Oct. 22, 1990) 
(Amending Article III, Section 3) (on file with author). 
 229. Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., AAA No. 75113030986 (Mar. 28, 
1989) (Morris, Arb.) (on file with author) [hereinafter Mar. 28 Arbitration]; U.S. 
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-90-5, FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT: 
CHANDLER LAKE LAND EXCHANGE NOT IN THE GOVERNMENT’S BEST INTEREST (Oct. 
1989), http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/148368.pdf [hereinafter GAO 90-5]. The 
transaction is also referred to as the Kaktovik Land Exchange, including in the 
arbitration proceedings on the matter. 
 230. GAO 90-5, supra note 229, at 2. 
 231. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 39.  
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demanded arbitration regarding the Chandler Lake land exchange 
pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.232 The claimants contended that 
revenue derived from the lands received by ASRC in the exchange were 
subject to Section 7(i) under several theories: (1) the lands received were 
in fact ANCSA lands prior to the trade; (2) the Chandler Lake exchange 
was a component of multiple contemporaneous trades between the 
United States and ASRC subject to Section 7(i); and (3) ASRC violated the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Alaska law by structuring 
the transaction to avoid Section 7(i).233 
The arbitration panel ruled against the claimants on all of their major 
theories. First, it held that “ASRC and the United States, parties to the 
[Chandler Lake land exchange], did not intend to merge” the other 
somewhat contemporaneous land exchanges between the two parties 
with the Chandler Lake exchange.234 It next held that the Chandler Lake 
land exchange “was a trade of surface for subsurface within the meaning 
of Article II, Section 6(g) of the 7(i) Settlement Agreement and revenues 
from the Kaktovik subsurface are exempt from the Section 7(i) 
distribution requirements.”235 Finally, while noting that “ASRC openly 
and candidly admitted that they structured the trade for the Kaktovik 
subsurface so as to qualify that trade under Section 6(g),” the panel found 
“ASRC was not deceitful, was not in bad faith and was not unfair in 
structuring a trade that was specifically invited by language in the 
[Settlement Agreement].”236 
Despite finding for ASRC on all major points, the panel did find that 
ASRC failed to properly allocate costs to deduct against certain Section 
7(i) revenues: “In the absence of an allocation of such costs, . . . the 
Settlement Agreement requires that such costs be denied in their 
entirety.”237 The panel therefore found that ASRC owed an additional 
$828,040 of Section 7(i) shareable revenue to the other regions, including 
interest.238 
In 1990, after studying the exchange, the GAO released a highly 
critical report entitled Chandler Lake Land Exchange Not in the Government’s 
Best Interest.239 The report discussed Section 7(i), noting: 
The exchange was structured in a way that the revenue-sharing 
provisions of the law did not apply. If Arctic Slope had obtained 
 
 232. Mar. 28 Arbitration, supra note 229, at 3–5. 
 233. Id.   
 234. Id. at 13. 
 235. Id. at 15. 
 236. Id. at 18. 
 237. Id. at 19. 
 238. Id. at 21. 
 239. GAO 90-5, supra note 229, at 1. 
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[Arctic National Wildlife Refuge] subsurface lands under the 
1980 law, rather than the Chandler Lake exchange, it would have 
been required to share any revenues derived from these lands 
with 11 other Alaska regional corporations.240 
The GAO also found that the land exchange was structured 
specifically to avoid Section 7(i) sharing obligations.241 The GAO noted 
that between 1984 and the date of the report, “ASRC ha[d] received about 
$30 million from its oil company partners for the exclusive right to 
conduct exploratory activities,” revenue that would have been shareable  
for other ANCSA land under Section 7(i).242 The GAO’s most noteworthy 
criticism of the exchange was that the Department of the Interior allowed 
ASRC to drill a test well on the land it received without retaining any right 
to the data or well results for the government.243 As a result, the GAO was 
not able to analyze whether the exchange was value-for-value244—a result 
required by the Settlement Agreement. 
Despite the arbitration panel finding in favor of ASRC, the tension 
between the Chandler Lake exchange lands and Section 7(i) reappears 
each time the larger congressional debate about opening the Arctic 
National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) to oil and gas exploration gains 
traction.245 As a part of the larger debate, some Alaska regional 
corporations attempt to make any potential earnings ASRC might receive 
from future oil and/or gas development on its lands within ANWR 
shareable under Section 7(i) of ANCSA.246 
Tax, Bankruptcy, and Emerging issues 
The interaction between Section 7(i) and the federal tax and 
bankruptcy laws has resulted in several interesting cases. In addition, due 
to the complexity of ANCSA, regional corporations, and resources, the 
 
 240. Id. at 4. 
 241. Id. at 21–22.  
 242. Id. at 21. 
 243. Id. at 18–19. 
 244. See id. at 20–21 (“[T]he village and regional corporations’ ability to select 
land with such high oil and gas potential increases the likelihood that Interior’s 
$5.9 million valuation of the rights exchanged may substantially understate the 
financial interests the government gave up.”). See also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, GAO/RCED-88-179, CONSIDERATION OF PROPOSED ALASKA LAND 
EXCHANGES SHOULD BE DISCONTINUED (Sept. 29, 1988),  
http://gao.gov/assets/150/146943.pdf (criticizing six other proposed land 
exchanges between the Department of Interior and various Native corporations 
involving Arctic National Wildlife Refuge land). 
 245. See, e.g., KONIAG, INC., SHAREHOLDER NEWS 2 (July 2006),  
https://www.koniag.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SHNL-2006-Jul.pdf. 
 246. Id. 
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future will undoubtedly present issues that the parties to the Settlement 
Agreement had not anticipated. For instance, two issues have recently 
arisen regarding the sale of carbon credits and conservation easements. 
Tax 
 
ANCSA includes a section regarding taxation,247 but it does not 
address the interaction between Section 7(i) and federal taxes at all. As a 
result, Alaska Native Corporations sought guidance from the Internal 
Revenue Service in the 1970s.248 
About the same time the regional corporations were litigating the 
intricacies of Section 7(i), a regional corporation sought tax guidance from 
the Internal Revenue Service regarding the tax consequences of 
distributions made pursuant to Sections 7(i) and 7(j).249 The regional 
corporation sought a ruling on a number of ANCSA-specific topics, 
including: 
Whether [a corporation] must include in gross income the 
money earned from its timber and subsurface estates that is 
divided annually with other Regional Corporations pursuant to 
Section 7(i) of the Act; and 
Whether [a corporation] must include in gross income amounts 
allocated to it from other Regional Corporations under Section 
7(i) of the Act.250 
The I.R.S. began its analysis by noting that “the Act itself is silent on 
the tax treatment to be accorded the natural resource revenues divisible 
among the Regional Corporations pursuant to Section 7(i).”251 It 
concluded that a regional corporation should “include in its gross income 
. . . only that amount of monies earned from its timber and subsurface 
estates that it retains after meeting the distribution requirements of 
Section 7(i) of the Act.”252 
 
 247. 43 U.S.C. § 1620.  
 248. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-38-123 (June 26, 1981) (giving tax consequences 
for village corporation of receipt of Section 7(j) distributions); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. 
Mem. 79-49-013 (Aug. 14, 1979) (giving tax consequences for regional corporation 
related to resource exploration transactions); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,720 (May 
6, 1976); see also The Alaska Native Management Report, IRS Ruling Request May 
be Filed Within 90 Days, at 1 (Jan. 31, 1974) (noting regional corporations were 
requesting an IRS ruling on various subjects including Section 7(i) receipts) (on 
file with author).  
 249. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,720. 
 250. Alaska Native Management Report, supra note 248, at 3. 
 251. Id. at 6. 
 252. Id. 
33.2 ARTICLE - SCHUTT (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2016  7:00 PM 
266 ALASKA LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:2 
With respect to the second question of distributions received by a 
regional corporation from another regional corporation under Section 
7(i), the conclusion was that such distributions were to be included in 
income.253 The I.R.S. concluded that the amounts distributed to village 
corporations and at-large shareholders pursuant to Section 7(j) were best 
characterized as “ordinary dividends” for tax purposes, noting that there 
“is no language in Section 7(j) upon which to base a distinction between 
the taxability of the corporate funds distributed to Village Corporations 
and the funds distributed to the Native shareholders.”254 
As noted above, Congress amended Section 7(i) in 1995 to make clear 
that the net operating loss sales, and other federal tax benefits, are not 
shareable revenues: “For purposes of this subsection, the term ‘revenues’ 
does not include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses 
incurred or credits earned by a Regional Corporation.”255 The Settlement 
Agreement makes most forms of state and federal taxes, exempting 
corporate income taxes, allowable Active Section 7(i) costs, but excludes 
federal and state tax issues from the otherwise fully encompassing, 
mandatory arbitration provision.256 
Bankruptcy 
 
Two regional Native Corporations have gone through the process of 
bankruptcy.257 One law review article anticipated that Section 7(i) could 
pose a major issue in a bankruptcy case: “Because section 7(i) and section 
7(j) income is without parallel in commercial law, the Bankruptcy Code 
provides no hints as to whether section 7(i) and section 7(j) income is 
treated differently from other kinds of income.”258  The article further 
notes that both a Native corporation and its creditors in a bankruptcy will 
likely compete for the Section 7(i) income as one major source of cash to 
satisfy the adverse interests of the debtor and the creditors.259 
 
 253. Id. at 7. 
 254. Id. at 8. 
 255. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Amendments sec. 109, § 7(i), 109 
Stat. 353 (1995) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1606).  
 256. See Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 48–50 (noting taxes as 
allowable Active Section 7(i) Costs); id. at 84 (“No arbitration shall be held 
concerning the Federal or State income tax consequences of revenues, deductions, 
distributions, or any other income tax issues under Section 7(i) or this 
Agreement.”). 
 257. Chugach Alaska Corp. v. United States, 34 F.3d 1462 (9th Cir. 1994); In re 
Bering Straits Native Corp., No. 2-86-00002 (Bankr. D. Alaska Mar. 5, 1986). At 
least one village corporation has also gone through bankruptcy. In re Haida Corp., 
No. 5X-85-00007 (Bankr. D. Alaska May 15, 1985). 
 258. Black et al., supra note 8, at 114. 
 259. Id. at 113. 
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In the case of regional corporation Bering Straits Native Corporation 
(BSNC), Section 7(i) played an outsized role in its bankruptcy case but not 
necessarily in the way predicted by the referenced law review article.260  
BSNC went bankrupt after making poor investments in several industries 
during its early years.261  In the same time period, BSNC also failed to pass 
through $13.2 million it received from Congress on behalf of the village 
corporations in its region, money from the Alaska Native Fund portion of 
ANCSA.262  In its bankruptcy, the village corporations became BSNC’s 
biggest creditors.263 
BSNC discharged its debt to the village corporations in its region by 
transferring by special warranty deed its subsurface estate below each 
respective village’s surface estate.264 The special warranty deed for each 
village corporation transferred the subsurface estate subject to, among 
other things, the “Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement agreed to as of June 
29, 1982, and filed with the U.S. District Court of the District of Alaska on 
April 6, 1983, in Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp.” and “[t]hat 
certain Section 7(i) Trust Agreement described in the [Fourth Amended 
Plan of Reorganization]” approved by the bankruptcy court on January 4, 
1989.265  In addition, the deed provided for ongoing intervention rights by 
BSNC to ensure compliance with Section 7(i) and the Settlement 
Agreement—an unusual, maybe unprecedented provision in a deed: 
If notice is properly and timely given in the manner described 
above but Grantee is or will be incapable of satisfying any 
obligation arising now or in the future under Section 7(i) of 
ANCSA, the Section 7(i) Settlement Agreement, or the Section 
7(i) Trust Agreement, then Grantor or Trustee may bring a civil 
action within 30 days of such notice to enjoin such transaction 
 
 260. See Section 7(i) Trust Agreement, Bering Straits Native Corp., Brevig 
Mission Native Corp., Golovin Native Corp., King Island Native Corp., Koyuk 
Native Corp., Mary’s Igloo Native Corp., Shaktoolik Native Corp., Shishmaref 
Native Corp., Sitnasuak Native Corp., Sound Quarry, Inc., St. Michael Native 
Corp., Stebbins Native Corp., Teller Native Corp., Unalakleet Native Corp., Wales 
Native Corp., and White Mountain Native Corp., Trustors (Jan. 20, 1989) (on file 
with author) (describing subsurface estate grants to village creditors with 
monitoring by BSNC for 7(i) compliance).  
 261. See Lori Thompson, Between Worlds – The Consequence of Inexperience, 
JUNEAU EMPIRE (Jan. 17, 1999),  http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modern-
alaska/between-worlds-the-consequence-of-inexperience (summarizing various 
financial decisions by the corporation). 
 262. Mark Baumgartner, Alaska’s Natives Getting Hard Lesson in Modern 
Business, Regional Corporations Run into Financial Difficulties, CHRISTIAN SCI. 
MONITOR (Apr. 21, 1986), http://www.csmonitor.com/1986/0421/adire.html. 
 263. Id. 
 264. See, e.g., Special Warranty Deed and Assignment, Bering Straits Native 
Corp. to Teller Native Corp. (Jan. 20, 1989) (on file with author).  
 265. Id. at 2. 
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until Grantee provides reasonable assurances of its ability to 
satisfy all such obligations that it has or may incur.266   
BSNC, in short, achieved a novel solution to fulfill obligations to its 
creditors in the bankruptcy while ensuring ongoing compliance with 
Section 7(i) and the Settlement Agreement. 
Carbon Credits 
 
The potential for sales of carbon credits is an emerging issue 
involving Section 7(i) and regional corporations. “A ‘forest carbon offset,’ 
is a metric ton of carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e)—the emission of 
which is avoided or newly stored—that is purchased by greenhouse gas 
emitters to compensate for emissions occurring elsewhere.”267 In 2015, the 
California Air Resources Board extended the geographic area of forested 
lands eligible to participate in its program to include the southeast and 
southern coastal areas of Alaska.268 
The Settlement Agreement did not squarely anticipate carbon credit 
transactions. It defines Section 7(i) resources subject to sharing as follows: 
“The timber resources (other than timber acquired by merger with a 
Village Corporation) and resources from the subsurface estate in ANCSA 
Lands. Timber resources include both standing timber and future 
growth.”269 While in some ways, a carbon credit sale is similar to sale of 
tax net operating losses, in other ways, carbon credits are tied more 
directly to the commercial value of a Section 7(i) shareable resource. Like 
a net operating loss, the sale of carbon credits does not involve a contract 
for the physical separation of a resource from ANCSA lands, or 
exploration for such a resource. However, when pairing the Settlement 
Agreement definition of a timber resource—which includes “standing 
timber and future growth”—with the definition of what is eligible for a 
carbon credit, it is clear that there is an argument that carbon credits are 
subject to Section 7(i). Importantly, the application of sharing under the 
Settlement Agreement does not require the physical act of harvesting 
timber, as Gross Section 7(i) Revenues are defined, in relevant part, as: 
all revenues (including money, benefits and any other thing of 
value) received by a Corporation that are attributable to, directly 
related to, or generated from the exploration, development, 
 
 266. Id. at 3. 
 267. Christine Yankel, FAQ Forest Carbon Projects, THE CLIMATE TRUST (Aug. 1, 
2014), http://www.climatetrust.org/forest-carbon-projects-faq/. 
 268. Press Release, Cal. Air Resources Board, Air Resources Board Approves 
Rice Cultivation Carbon Offset Protocol, Expands Forestry Offset Protocol (June 
25, 2015), http://www.arb.ca.gov/newsrel/newsrelease.php?id=736 
 269. Settlement Agreement, supra note 35, at 2. 
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production, lease, sale or other exploitation of, or the disposition 
of any interest in, the Corporation’s Section 7(i) Resources shall 
be included in Gross Section 7(i) Revenues.270 
This issue has yet to formally arise under the Settlement Agreement, 
but may turn on whether a carbon credit is found to be a “sale or other 
exploitation of” or “the disposition in any interest in” an ANCSA timber 
resource.271 
A relevant policy consideration also militates in favor of required 
sharing of carbon credit transactions. The Settlement Agreement and the 
Section 7(i) litigation that precipitated the agreement favor the sharing of 
revenue.272 If carbon credit sales were found to be non-shareable, regional 
corporations would have a strong economic incentive not to enter into 
either active or passive development of a timber resource. Instead, 
regional corporations would be incentivized to transact carbon credit 
sales involving the same resources and keep 100% of the proceeds. This 
runs contrary to the Aleut V decision, which “recognized that it must 
avoid interpretations which ‘would encourage the resource controlling 
corporation to devise all sorts of contractual schemes for maximizing its 
present revenues at the expense of its sister corporations.’”273 
Conservation Easements 
 
The sale of conservation easements is also becoming more prevalent 
for ANCSA corporations, and is largely an emerging and untested area 
for purposes of Section 7(i). The IRS defines conservation easement 
transactions as follows: 
Conservation easements permanently restrict how land or 
buildings are used. The “deed of conservation easement” 
describes the conservation purpose(s), the restrictions and the 
permissible uses of the property. The deed must be recorded in 
the public record and must contain legally binding restrictions 
enforceable by the donee organization under state law.  The 
property owner gives up certain rights but retains ownership of 
 
 270. Id. at 3.  
 271. Id.  
 272. See Aleut II, 417 F. Supp. 900, 903 (D. Alaska 1976) (agreeing, as a general 
principle, that “‘all revenues’ should include benefits of every sort so long as such 
are received by a regional corporation in exchange” for ANCSA timber and 
subsurface rights). See also Special Master Report, supra note 28, at 19 (“With minor 
exceptions, any consideration received by a Regional Corporation attributable to 
the sale or disposition of any interest in its § 7(i) resources must be included in 
distributable revenues.”). 
 273. Aleut V, 484 F. Supp. 482, 485 (D. Alaska 1980) (quoting Aleut I, 410 F. 
Supp. 1196, 1200 (D. Alaska 1976)). 
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the underlying property. The extent and nature of the donee 
organization’s control depends on the terms of the conservation 
easement. The organization has an interest in the encumbered 
property that runs with the land, which means that its 
restrictions are binding not only on the landowner who grants 
the easement but also on all future owners of the property.274 
Conservation easements have not been tested in the context of 
Section 7(i), although there have been several recent transactions 
involving ANCSA lands.275 Conservation easements differ significantly 
from carbon credits in that the regional corporation would generally only 
receive a tax benefit as consideration for the granting of the easement.276 
The 1995 amendments to ANCSA specifically amended Section 7(i), as 
follows: “for purposes of this subsection the term ‘revenues’ does not 
include any benefit received or realized for the use of losses incurred or 
credits earned by a Regional Corporation.”277 As was the case with the net 
operating losses in the Bay View litigation, the benefit a regional 
corporation receives from a conservation easement would likely be 
characterized as “a product of the tax status of the Regional 
Corporation[]” and not subject to Section 7(i) sharing.278 
CONCLUSION 
When Congress enacted ANCSA, it endeavored to create an 
equitable land settlement with Alaska’s Native people. An important part 
of the equity was internal economic parity between the various Alaska 
Native groups. Congress used the revenue sharing mechanism of Section 
7(i) to help minimize the creation of “haves” and “have nots.” 
But the simplicity and brevity of the original language of Section 7(i) 
led to a decade of litigation, followed by a detailed Settlement Agreement, 
further followed by almost another decade of arbitration under the 
 
 274. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., CONSERVATION EASEMENT AUDIT TECHNIQUES 
GUIDE ch. 1 (last updated Jan. 3, 2012), https://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-
Businesses-&-Self-Employed/Conservation-Easement-Audit-Techniques-
Guide#_Toc116. 
 275. See, e.g., PEDRO BAY CORP., Pedro Bay Corporation Conservation Easement 
Project Description (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.pedrobaycorp.com/index.php/ 
latest-news/310-pedro-bay-corporation-conservation-easement-project-
description (listing recent transactions); BRISTOL BAY HERITAGE LAND TRUST, 
AGULOWAK CONSERVATION EASEMENT, http://www.bristolbaylandtrust.org/ 
agulowak-conservation-easement (last visited June 14, 2016). 
 276. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 274, at ch. 2 (noting tax benefits 
are the most common form of compensation). 
 277. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Amendments sec. 109, § 7(i), 109 
Stat. 353 (1995) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1606). 
 278. Bay View II, 278 F.3d 1259, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2001), discussed at E.2.a., supra. 
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Settlement Agreement. That history was likely not the intent of Congress. 
Ultimately, however, Section 7(i) has resulted in the sharing between the 
regional corporations of several billion dollars of revenue derived from 
resources from ANCSA lands. And it has quietly played an important role 
in economic equity and the success of Alaska Native corporations.  
